Chapter 78 – John

Charles Bean includes a detailed description of the attack by the 4th Brigade on Hill 971 on 8 August 1915 in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol II, chapter XXIII: The Attempt on Hill 971 (pp. 652-665). Some referenced details include:

p. 593-4 – at 5:00am on 7 August 1915, Monash sent out telephone lines, and 13th and 14th reported they were at intended location prior to final assault on Hill 971. Colonel Pope [16th Btn commander] advised that his right flank was on a spur of Abdel Rahman Bair. This position was sent back to higher command as the position reached by Monash’s Brigade. Major Overton killed at dawn 7 Aug with Gurkas near head of Aghyl Dere

p. 635 – At about 8:00am on  the morning of 7 August, a new attack was ordered by Cox for about 11am. Monash went forward and realised that Colonel Pope had been mistaken in reporting his position. An additional valley lay between the 4th Brigade and their objectives and the troops were not yet near the position from which the final attack was to be launched. Monash represented this situation strongly to Cox and obtained permission to fortify the line he had won.

p. 652 – On the morning of 7 August, when Monash believed his troops were in the intended location from which to launch an assault on Hill 971, he obtained permission to dig in for the day. Sniper fire was heavy and many men could only lie in their shallow rifle pits all day.

p. 654 – Godley’s two messages to Monash, sent at about dusk on 7 August are as quoted: “The G.O.C. wishes you to close the troops… well up the slopes towards the enemy during the preliminary bombardment of the position, so as to be ready to reach the crest as soon as the gun-fire stops tomorrow morning. The assault should be carried out with loud cheering.” And: “I feel confident that, after today’s rest, and starting comparatively fresh, your brigade will make a determined effort to capture the key of the position… Selecting it for this task, I had the original brigade in mind, but we all expect the reconstituted brigade to live up to the traditions of the original.” A map is included showing Monash’s supposed position and actual position, about 800 yards different.

p. 655-656 – Men were roused shortly after 2am, 15th Battalion lead out, across first valley onto the next ridge under cover of a naval bombardment that thundered into Hill 971 and other summits. Turkish howitzers fired on men from low hills to the east. At 4:15am, in pale dawn light, the bombardment ceased as planned. The men were due to be “ready to reach” Hill 971 according to Godley’s order, but were a long way short. The men met Turk scouts, then machine gun fire “rapidly increased to tornado-like intensity”.

p. 657 – Two machine guns were visible on a high bluff on the left front, and others opened from the main ridge. A Turkish field gun on 971 fired, but was silenced by naval guns. machine guns continued. The Turk infantry appeared in force and a fire fight followed. The Australian force became split.

p. 658 – The true course and location was confirmed by Charles Bean in 1919 on the historical mission to Gallipoli.

p. 661 – Men sheltered in first valley from machine gun fire. The telephone wire was cut by shell-fire during the attack, and was mended soon after 7:00am by Sapper Murfitt of the Australian Corps Signals Company. Pope informed brigadier that the battalions certainly could not accomplish their task, that the enemy had strong machine guns and was now shelling also. He concluded that there was no advantage to staying where they were. Monash repeated this report to Cox who ordered the column to withdraw to its lines.

p. 662 – Machine gun sections covered withdrawal effectively.

p. 663-664 – Charles Bean concludes that the mission could not have been achieved over such difficult country within the allowed time, even in daylight during peace time, by fit and healthy men, and he states “…it appears reasonable to conclude that, without complete success on the part of the Suvla force, the attainment of Hill 971 by Birdwood’s left assaulting column was never within the range of human possibility…”

Roland Perry describes the August offensive in his biography Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War .  Some details referenced include:

p. 218 – At 5:30pm on 7 August 1915, Cox gave Monash the new plan of attack for the following morning. Monash protested to Cox that the 4th Brigade could not go on.

p. 219 – Monash demanded reinforcements from British IX Army – given 6th Kings Own Royal Lancasters. Monash used them to hold line with 13th Battalion and release 14th Battalion. Monash planned for the 14th, 15th and 16th Battalions to attack as ordered. Perry concludes that “it seems almost certain” that Cox forced Monash to stay back with him, rather than lead the troops himself. Monash put Colonel Pope in charge of the three battalions. Communications would be via telephone wire connection. At 6:00pm, the attack was ordered for 3:00am the following morning. Monash spent 90 minutes reconnoitring, then held a conference with his commanders at 8:30pm. Monash slept from 10:00pm until 2:00am on 8 August – his first rest for two days. At 2:30am Monash was on a high knoll above his headquarters, directing his troops. At 4:00am the 15th, led by Pope, marched off towards Kaiajik Valley, 14th and 16th behind it. They were hit by an “inferno” from their right – first machine gun, then shelling. The moment it abated, Turks attacked. Telephone lines were cut within 30 minutes of the start of the attack, leaving Pope in charge of virtually the whole brigade without access to a higher command. Lines were restored by 7:00am and Pope reported the hopeless situation.

p. 220 – Monash put 3 options to Cox:

1. Entrench – Monash knew that Cox knew this would mean men would be butchered.

2. Advance – two more battalions of reinforcements would be required and there was no time for reinforcement.

3. Withdraw.

Cox agreed to withdrawal. Monash ordered his powerful machine gun unit into place and ordered retreat. Turks came from cover in full light of early morning and were chopped up by the gunners. By 8:30am, 8 Aug, the remnant of the 14th, 15th and16 Battalions were back at the 4th Brigade line. The mission was over, unaccomplished and Monash was “once more displeased his superiors’ poor judgement.”

Peter Pederson, in Monash as a Military Commander , describes John Monash and the 4th Brigade’s involvement in the August offensive. Pederson describes the circumstances of  the men of the 4th Brigade on 7 August: “Lying on the ground to avoid the sniping, they scratched holes and then rolled into them, remaining there for the rest of the day without water  under the scorching sun.” (p. 107).